1997; Sherman, McMulIen, & Gavanski, 1992) . Thus, judging mammogram results as conditional on breast cancer may be more natural than judging breast cancer as conditional on mammogram results, because people who have breast cancer are easier to think of as a reference set than are people with positive mammogram results. In Gavanski and Hui's (1992) terms, breast cancer offers a more natural sampling space than an artificial index, such as a mammogram. These authors demonstrated that when conditional on a natural sampling space, probability judgments are rather accurate. Judges may disregard the instruction to judge p(y/f.) and erroneously represent the problem as p(x/y), when y provides a better basis for natural sampling than x (Sherman et aL, 1992) .
Several factors can determine which variables allow for natural sampling and which variables are spontaneously chosen as a condition in probabilistic inference. These variables often belong to natural kinds (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) , have causal power (Cheng, 1997; White, 1995) , or may be wholistic rather than specific (Gavanski & Hui, 1992) ; or the choice of a sampling space is influenced by motivated attention (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; McMulIen et al., 1997) , priming (Hanita, Gavanski, & Fazio, 1997) , or retrieval cues (Arkes & Rothbart, 1985) . Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) recently advanced an alternative account of the base rate fallacy and a refraining of the notion of natural sampling. These authors presented the breast cancer problem (and other frequently cited problems) to different experimental groups either in the above probability format or in the following frequency format:
Frequency Versus Probability Formats
Ten out of 1,000 women have breast cancer (corresponding to 1% base rate). Of the women having breast cancer, 8 have a positive mammogram (i.e., 80% hits). Of those 990 women having no breast cancer, the mammognun is positive in 95 cases (9.6% false alarms).
In this frequency-format condition, approximately 50% of the judgments were in line with the Bayes theorem, as compared with 20% in the probability-format condition. The researchers obtained similar results with other Bayesian inference tasks.
In interpreting these challenging results, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) made a strong claim for an evolutionary approach to bounded and ecological rationality. Accordingly, humans have evolved cognitive algorithms for statistical inferences that are tuned to frequency rather than probability formats. It is argued that "an organism acquires information about the structure of its environment by the natural sampling of frequencies" (p. 686). Primates and even lower animals are highly sensitive to variations in event frequencies (Galh'stel, 1990; Real, 1991) , which are encoded easily and almost automatically (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Hintzman, 1976) , whereas probabilities were only lately introduced after the advent of mathematical probability theory (cf. Gigerenzer et al., 1989) . The surprising improvement would thus be mainly due to the shift from the artificial probability format to the natural frequency format. This view receives further support from experiments on the conjunction fallacy and other judgment biases (Betsch, Biel, Eddelbiittel, & Mock, 1998; Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer, 1991) . 1 Theoretically, these recent findings replace the above interpretation that humans are blind for base rates or consensus information (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Borgida & Brekke, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975) by the evolutionary argument that human cognition is tuned to natural formats. If the format fits their evolved equipment, judgments are accurate but base rates are obsolete. To "compute" thatp(breast cancer/positive mammogram) is only 7.8%, judges only need to relate the 8 cases having a positive mammogram and breast cancer to all 8 + 95 cases with a positive mammogram, which clearly yields a ratio below 10%. In this format, it is easy to see that even within the positive mammogram subset, breast cancer remains very unlikely.
However, a closer look at Gigerenzer and Hoffrage's (1995) format manipulation reveals that it confounds statistical format with another factor. When given in frequency format, statistical data are explicitly related to a clearly defined sample or reference set (i.e., the grand total of all 1,000 women). This reference set warrants a common scale on which all data can be easily compared. It is thus obvious that the number of women (8) with a positive mammogram and breast cancer is very small compared to the number of women (95) with a positive mammogram and no breast cancer (in Gigerenzer & Hoffrage's standard frequency condition), or compared to the overall frequency of 103 women with a positive mamrnogram.
In the probability conditions, in contrast, the grand total is not given as a unitary reference point. In the so-called standard probability version, the hit rate, ^(positive mammogram/breast cancer) = 80%, mimics a large quantity relative to the false alarm rate, p(positive mammogram/no breast cancer) = 9.6%. However, because 80% refers to a subsample of only 1% of women with breast cancer, whereas 9.6% refers to the complementary 99% subsample of women without breast cancer, the two figures cannot be compared as quantities on the same scale. As 80% relates to a very small subset, this quantity inflates the actual coincidence of a positive mammogram and breast cancer. Note that conditionalizmg mammogram data on separate subsamples for women with and without breast cancer is fully irrelevant and seriously misleading, for the task is to estimate the probability of breast cancer only within those having a positive mammogram.
2 Figure 1 suggests a way to disentangle the confounded factors, statistical format, and reference set. In the upper two task versions, statistics appear as cardinal frequencies, whereas the lower two tasks use a probability format. On the left, all data can be inter-1 Of particular interest is Gigerenzer and Hoffrage's (1995) Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, p. 687) . 2 Gigerenzer and Hoffrage also included a "short probability version" in which judges learn that the probability of a positive mammogram is 10.3% and the joint probability of breast cancer and a positive mammogram is 0.8%. Although not directly misleading, this version also does not make the grand total explicit, so that the common scale reference remains implicit. Interpretation of the task is thus dependent on judges' ability to understand that both percentages refer to the same sample, which increases the task difficulty. Not surprisingly, performance in this condition is above the misleading standard probability condition but still below the frequency condition that provides an explicit reference scale. preted on a common scale, relative to the grand total of all 1,000
Frequency Format Equal Scale

BC no BC
Frequency Format Unequal Scale
BC
women. In contrast, on the right, statistics refer to different subsamples (10 vs. 990) and therefore cannot be interpreted on the same numerical scale.
The upper left and the lower right task versions correspond to Gigerenzer and Hoffrage's (1995) (standard) frequency and probability conditions. To isolate the relative impact of both factors, one has to look at the remaining two task versions. If statistical format per se is crucial, frequency format should continue to produce accurate judgments, even when frequencies refer to different reference sets (upper right). However, if improved performance is due to a common reference set, then a common reference to the grand total should lead to accurate judgments, even when presented in probability format (bottom left).
The theory outlined in the next section offers good reasons to expect that the incompatibility of statistics that lack a common scale reference is indeed the crucial factor, rather than the format factor per se. What makes probabilistic inference hard is the requirement to mentally transform and integrate incompatible statistics. Note that this cognitive restriction has nothing to do with the neglect of base rates. Precisely because judges try to take base rates into account, they encode the hit frequency "8 M+ within 10
BC cases" as a higher quantity than "95 M+ within 990 No BC cases." Unfortunately, when later asked to judge p(BC/M+), judges have the problem of getting rid of the differential reference sets (i.e., 10 and 990) and focusing exclusively on the 8 and 95
M+ cases.
A Sampling Approach to Conditional Probability Judgments
The theory advanced here assumes that probability judgments have to rely on samples. Hardly any probability can be perceived directly or assessed exhaustively. Rather, judges have to infer the probability that holds in an ecological universe from a sample of available data. It does not matter whether samples stem from the external environment or from internal memories. Samples provide the cognitive-ecological interface that enables judges to make inferences about ecological entities based on available subsets of information. To use a common statistical metaphor, sample statistics provide estimators for inferring latent population parameters.
Within this metaphor, the cognitive process can be decomposed into (a) estimation of the probability in question within an available sample and (b) a metacognitive control process that adjusts sample-based inferences for potential biases in the sampling procedure. For example, when planning a holiday trip, one will estimate the probability of rainy days in different countries and thereby rely on relevant samples of previous experiment (a). However, different samples may not be comparable for various reasons: they may stem from different seasons (e.g., March vs. July); they may come from differentially valid or credible sources (e.g., direct experience vs. second hand); their reliability may vary with sample size; samples may be selective (e.g., better recall of sunny days); and the sampling algorithm may vary (e.g., assessing how many days in Country X have been rainy vs. assessing how many rainy days have been in Country X). Thus, sample-based judgments have to be adjusted for sampling constraints and the potential biases arising from the integration of noncomparable samples (b).
For convenience, we refer to (a) as an inductive process component, because estimating a probability within a finite sample is basically a data-driven process that only involves scanning a sample (e.g., memorized prior holidays) for a prompt (e.g., rainy days) and quantifying the output of that scanning process (e.g., the quantity of rainy days, perhaps normalized for sample size). Although in reality the formation of sample estimates may not be purely data driven but contaminated with deductive influences (e.g., expectancies, motivated biases), such influences can be controlled experimentally to create ideally inductive task situations.
In contrast, the metacognitive control and adjustment process (b), by which samples of different provenience are integrated and utilized for the final probability judgment, involves a number of deductive, rule-based operations. The necessary devices include logical rules (e.g., "Are sunny and rainy days complementary events?"), probability calculus (e.g., analog of Bayes theorem to transformp(x/y) statistics into p(y/x) judgments), statistical knowledge (e.g., more regression in small than large samples), or metacognitive knowledge (e.g., memory samples can be biased motivationally).
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Our theory (as delineated in Fiedler, in press) posits that the inductive component (a) of assessing sample-based estimates is often surprisingly accurate, at least under ideal conditions (e.g., motivation, absence of misleading expectancies). As long as sam-pies happen to be unbiased and directly applicable to the judgment problem, the resulting probability judgments should also be unbiased and accurate. However, severe biases may arise within the second process component (b) when sample estimates are not directly applicable. Then the judgment task calls for deductive operations on the sample statistics, such as converting quantities assessed on different scales, reversing conditional probabilities, performing mental computation of complementary probabilities, correcting for selective samples stemming from biased sources, and considering quota samples that overrepresent particular events. Judgment biases might arise because, over many problem contexts, judges would take sample estimates for granted and not apply appropriate adjustments and transformations, for they lack the necessary metacognitive devices. Although the present article is confined to explaining base rate neglect, the same sampling approach extends to various other judgment biases (Fiedler, in press; Fiedler, Walther, Freytag, & Plessner, 2000; Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel, 1999) .
Supporting evidence for the first part of the assumption, which concerns the accuracy of inductive performance, comes from many experiments that highlight the sensitivity of frequency estimates (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Hintzman, 1976; Sedlmeier, Hertwig, & Oigerenzer, 1998) and the accuracy of social judgments, even when based on impoverished samples (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992; Fiedler, Walther, Freytag, et al., 2000) . There is also rich evidence for the second, more pessimistic part of the assumption. A long tradition of research in the Wason (1966) paradigm and on syllogistic reasoning leaves the suspicion that even the simplest rules of deductive (i.e., formal, content-free) reasoning cannot be expected even in intelligent people (Cox & Griggs, 1982; Koehler, 1993; Pollard & Evans, 1987) . People do not understand that small samples are more regressive than large samples (Fiedler, 1991; Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel, 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) , and judges do not correct for even obvious biases of selective sampling (Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel, 1999; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Patrick & lacono, 1991; Swann, Giuliano, & Wegner, 1982) .
To be sure, our approach does not exclude the possibility of obtaining content influences (e.g., enhanced accuracy in a natural sampling space; see Gavanski & Hui, 1992) or format effects (e.g., probability vs. frequency formats; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) . However we do not believe that these content and format factors impose absolute restrictions on thinking (cf. Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) . Even with unnatural categories (e.g., M+ or HTV positive), conditional probability judgments can be remarkably accurate given appropriate sampling input Likewise, human intelligence should be adaptive enough to deal with normalized probabilities rather than cardinal frequencies.
Overview of Experiments
In the remainder of this article, we report four experiments that apply the above theoretical approach to the explanation of base rate neglect. In Experiment 1, the inductive component was cut short, as in most previous experiments, in that sampling was left to the experimenter. Judges were given summary statistics (i.e., probabilities or frequencies) about the relation between a predictor (e.g., M+) and a criterion to be predicted (e.g., BC), and the task called for transformation of this input into probability judgment.
We manipulated the level of demand of this deductive transformation process. Orthogonal to the statistical format (frequency vs. probability), we manipulated the need to transform the input statistics (i.e., referring to a common reference set or not; see Figure 1 ).
According to the present theory, judgments-of p(BC/M+), for example-should have been quite accurate if the input statistics could be used directly, on a common reference scale. Judges should have recognized correctly that p(BC/M+) was rather low, whether they received common-scale frequencies (8 M+ cases with BC and 95 M+ cases without BC, both relative to the total set of 1,000 cases) or common-scale probabilities (0.8% and 9.3%, relative to the total set). However, when the reference set changed, both frequencies (8 M+ within 10 BC cases compared with 95 M+ within 895 No BC cases) or probabilities (80% M+ given BC compared with 9.6% M+ given No BC) should have been misleading. Thus, biases mainly should have arisen when input statistics had to be transformed at the deductive level.
We then used an information search paradigm in Experiments 2 and 3 to illuminate the inductive process component. Having control over the actual sampled data, we could directly measure the sensitivity of p(criterion/predictor) judgments to the proportion p*(criterion/predictor) within the sample. 4 Accuracy should have been high, as long as the gathered samples were unbiased and directly applicable. Yet if the search algorithm resulted in misleading samples requiring rule-based transformations, the lack of necessary deductive devices would have produced severely biased judgments. The emphasis was on two different search algorithms, predictor sampling (i.e., looking at different predictor values, M+ or M-, or get feedback on the criterion, BC or No BC) versus criterion sampling (i.e., looking at criterion values, BC or No BC, to get predictor feedback, M+ or M-). Gathering information about different levels of the predictor should have yielded directly applicable sample statistics, p*(BC/M+) and p*(BC/M-), that were only subject to sampling error. In contrast, conditionalizing information search on the criterion, cases with and without BC, should have produced a typical sampling bias. Judges should have often oversampled the critical, low base rate cases (e.g., BC), which would then be overrepresented in the sample. However, they still should have based their judgments on the proportion p*(BC/M+) in the sample and failed to adjust the estimate for the fact that the sample base rate was exaggerated. We randomly allocated participants of Experiment 2 to the predictor and criterion sampling conditions. Experiment 3 participants could freely choose which search direction they found appropriate. This choice should have been diagnostic for their understanding of sampling constraints.
Experiment 4 extended the findings and illuminated the metacognitive deficit from a different task perspective, using a broader array of judgment problems. Rather than making their own judgments, participants evaluated the appropriateness of research findings on the basis of descriptions of the underlying sample procedure. Sampling was either by the predictor or by the criterion; in the latter case, the focal event was either overrepresented in a quota sample or the low base rate was maintained. The question was whether judges at various levels of statistical training would understand that sample estimates p*(criterion/predictor) were biased as the base rate ^criterion) was exaggerated.
Experiment 1
We manipulated orthogonally the format (probability vs. frequency) and the scale reference of input statistics, as in Figure 1 .
Within both the frequency and the probability format condition, statistics either referred to the same reference sets (i.e., the grand total) or to different reference sets (i.e., the small vs. large subsets of BC and No BC cases, respectively). We also manipulated the explicit instruction to take either the perspective of somebody who is to judge the criterion as a function of the predictor or the perspective of somebody who judges the predictor as a function of the criterion. If judges only confused p(criterioii/predictor) witĥ (predictor/criterion), an explicit instruction to take the correct perspective should have enhanced their performance.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred ninety-eight male and female students of different majors at the Universities of Mannheim and Heidelberg participated either voluntarily or to fulfill a study requirement They were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental groups resulting from the orthogonal manipulation of three between-subjects factors-statistical format (frequency vs. probability), common versus incompatible reference scales, and the perspective manipulation.
Materials. Four inference tasks were selected from a larger pool (used in student exercises). All four items somehow referred to medical or health-related problems that make sense to most student participants (see Appendix A). In addition to the mammogram-breast cancer task, judges were asked to make other probability judgments pertaining to dangerous complications in one of two hospitals, prenatal lung damages given the pharmacological Dermofit, and anorexia given unresolved sex role conflicts.
The structure of all four tasks can be represented by a 2 X 2 scheme, me rows of which correspond to the presence or absence of the predictor event,
x, and the columns of which refer to the presence or absence of the criterion, y (see Table 1 ). For example, in the anorexia task, the rows denote the presence or absence of unresolved sex role conflicts, and the columns denote the presence or absence of anorexia. The explicit judgment task always called for an inference within the first row (i.e., estimating the ratio of the left cell by the sum of the first row).
The statistical information for the four task frames (see Table 1 ) accords to the following rules. The base rate of the criterion event to be predicted, y, is always low, p(y) < p(not y). As a consequence, the conditional probability to be estimated, /Ky/x), is also low and well below the reverse conditional probability p(x/y), or hit rate, in the first column. As in many previous experiments on Bayesian inference, the key to accurate judgment is not to overestimate p(y/x).
Three aspects of these judgment tasks were manipulated. Fust, the statistical input data were presented either in frequency format or in For the study, 1,026 women were examined.
101 (10%) women were anorexic and 925 (90%) were not; of the anorexic women, 78 (77%) had an unresolved sex role conflict and 23 (23%) did not;
and of the non-anorexic women, 197 (21%) had an unresolved sex role conflict and 728 (79%) did not.
By comparison, in the equal reference scale condition, all quantities referred to the same grand total of all 1,026 cases, rather than different subsamples of anorexic and non-anorexic women.
The criteria! question at the end of each task asked for the probability (in percentage) of the crucial event given the presence of the predictor event.
For example, in the anorexia problem, the question read, "Given these data, what is the probability of anorexia if a woman has an unresolved sex role conflict? The probability is %." Immediately after the probability judgment, participants were also asked to indicate their subjective confidence.
Procedure. Questionnaires were randomly distributed during a lecture.
Instructions on the fust page asked participants to work through the questionnaire at their own pace, without talking to or looking at other respondents. The time required to complete the questionnaire ranged from 15 to 25 min. Afterward, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
We computed three-factorial (Format X Reference X Perspective) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for each task, using the signed difference between subjective and objective probabilities as the dependent measure. Numerically high values on this score reflect the typical base rate neglect, whereas numerically low values indicate that the infrequency of the crucial event was noticed correctly. Table 2 gives the mean scores per experimental condition and the relevant test statistics.
The only significant effect, regularly obtained across tasks, is due to the scale reference manipulation. When stimulus quantities were based on a common sample (grand total), the average estimates came as close as 5% to 10% to the correct value. The mean deviation scores were more than twice as high when stimulus data referred to unequal subsamples. The respective main effects were highly significant for three tasks: F(l, 189) = 13.62, p < .001, for lung damage; F(l, 188) = 9.24, p < .01, for anorexia; and F(l, 189) = 49.38, p < .001, for breast cancer. The main effect fell short of significance only for the complications problem, F(l, 190) = 2.59.
The lack of a format effect supports the suspicion that statistical format per se is not the decisive determinant. Accurate judgments were only contingent on input statistics referring to a common reference set, the grand total. If quantities were given on unequal, confusing scales, relating high and low quantities to different reference sets (e.g., anorexia cases enhanced as 78 out of 101 and non-anorexia cases belittled as 197 out of 925), the resulting judgments were strongly biased. Obviously, judges did not have the deductive devices to rescale the statistics accordingly. Given this inability to rescale or convert quantities that were given in confusingly different units, it is no surprise that the seemingly strong and almost blatant perspective manipulation had no effect at all. This instruction manipulation did induce a deliberate attempt to interpret the inference task in the correct (or incorrect) direction. Yet, even when judges correctly understood the inference direction-to judge p(criterion/predictor) rather than the reverse-they failed to do so unless the input data could be interpreted on a common scale. The ineffectiveness of the perspective manipulation suggests that confusing the roles of predictors and criteria can hardly explain the deficit-a suggestion pursued in the next experiments.
To summarize, when judges received numerical statistics, either frequencies or probabilities, the resulting judgments were quite accurate when quantities could be interpreted on the same scale. In this condition, judges did not need a helpful perspective or an extra reminder to understand the inference task in the correct direction. However, as soon as input statistics referred to unequal subsamples, so that small and large quantities were confusing, judgment performance decreased markedly. This overwhelming factor was clearly more effective than the statistical format manipulation (raw frequencies vs. probabilities) emphasized by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) .
Experiment 2
Presenting probabilistic inference problems in a questionnaire is of restricted value. Experiment 1 provides no direct evidence for the sampling process supposed to mediate the probability judg-merit performance. Furthermore, the manipulation of the statistical format (frequency vs. probability) may have been too weak (because of superficial reading). We have no guarantee that judges understood the inference direction correctly. We cannot exclude that the effective scale reference manipulation was contaminated with other factors, such as complexity. Thus, all statistics that refer to the grand total rather than differential subsamples may not only differ in the scaling unit but also in the memory load.
In these and other respects, Experiment 2 provided an improvement. Using the same four inference tasks, we were guaranteed a genuine frequency input and a common natural scaling unit in all conditions by having the participants actively search for relevant information in computer dialog. Understanding this sequential format was not contingent on attentive reading but arose naturally from an inductive observation process. Moreover, an information search paradigm permitted experimental control over the actual taken perspective, that is, whether judges searched by the predictor (e.g., seeing if patients with or without sex role conflicts have anorexia) or searched by the criterion (seeing if anorexic and non-anorexic patients have sex role conflicts).
Most importantly, this methodology allowed for the experimental control of the actual drawn stimulus samples as a crucial mediator of probabilistic inferences. Questionnaire studies with experimenter-provided summary statistics cut this mediator short.
However, in many real-problem situations, pre-edited input statistics are not available, and judges have to sample relevant information in the environment or in their memories. Our information search paradigm allowed us to directly assess the effective stimulus samples and to elucidate its key role in probability judgment.
The manipulation of predictor versus criterion sampling was the chief independent variable in Experiment 2. We used two index card files in which all cases were registered (e.g., the population of all women in the breast cancer problem). We organized one file by the predictor; the visible side of each index card indicated M+ versus M-cases. As participants drew one M+ or M-card, the back side provided feedback on whether BC was present or not. We organized the other file by the criterion; scanning for BC and
No BC cases resulted in M+ or M-feedback on the back side.
Note that such an active search paradigm warranted natural frequency formats in all conditions. Moreover, we used the same artificial predictor variables (like M+) as in Experiment 1. Thus, if judgments were strongly constrained by frequency formats or natural categories, performance would have been either constantly high or constantly low. However, we did not expect either outcome, but that performance should have varied markedly as a function of the samples drawn. Predictor sampling should have resulted in unbiased samples, leading to much more accurate judgments than criterion sampling that should have produced severe biases, for the reasons illustrated in Figure 2 .
When sampling was conditional on the predictor (M+ vs. M-), Note that the prediction of more accurate judgments in the predictor sampling condition is not at all trivial. When judges searched the wrong way-by the criterion-they also noticed inevitably when scanning the file that the base rate of BC index cards was extremely low. When they were later asked to judge the probability of BC given M+, they had all the information (hit rate, false alarm rate, base rate) that judges have had in traditional experiments. They even received this information in frequency format Moreover, the prediction is not trivial simply because it is partly wrong. Sampling by the criterion need not always lead to erroneous judgments. Biased judgments should have only occurred to the extent that the crucial event was overrepresented in the sample. Thus, within the information search paradigm, we can set apart our approach to base rate neglect from the influence of statistical format (frequency vs. probability) or problem contents (natural vs. artificial kinds), which were held constant. We can also rule out sampling in the wrong direction alone as a sufficient explanation, just as the notion that judges confused p(y/x) with p(iJy). However, we can show that judgments were biased exactly when samples were biased but estimates of p(y/x) were directly based on p(y/x)* in the sample.
Method
Participants and design. Sixty male and female students of the University of Heidelberg participated either for payment or as part of their study requirements. Within each of the four problems, participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions resulting from the orthogonal variation of task perspective (same as in Experiment 1) and sampling direction (predictor vs. criterion sampling). One subset of participants was assigned to predictor sampling on Task 1 and 3 and to criterion sampling on Task 2 and 4, whereas the assignment was reversed for the other group. The perspective was held constant over all four tasks.
Thus, for each particular .task, the resulting design was a 2 (Perspectives) X 2 (Sampling Direction) between-participants factorial.
Materials and procedure. The same four inference tasks were used as in Experiment 1. Only the presentation style was altered: Rather than in questionnaire style, the whole experiment was conducted in computer dialog, with all instructions, information search, and judgmental measures presented on the computer screen. The first screen contained general instructions, referring to an experiment on "judgments of uncertain events." Then the first problem was described, followed by the perspective manipulation. Participants read the instructions and problem presentations at their own speed, using any keystroke to call for the next screen. The task order was held constant across participants (complications, lung damage, anorexia, breast cancer).
The sampling manipulation was accomplished as follows. Participants were told that there were two different file organizations. In one file box, all registered cases were classified by the predictor, whereas in the other file box, they were classified by the criterion. For example, in the file box for predictor search, one could see cases with and without unresolved sex role conflicts. Selecting one case would reveal a feedback as to whether anorexia was present in that case. By contrast, the file box for criterion search showed cases with and without anorexia. Selecting any one case would yield feedback on whether sex role conflicts were present in that case.
Note that even in the criterion file box (organized opposite to the judgment task), judges received all information that was needed to judgê (criterion/predictor). For example, when looking at cases with and without anorexia, judges not only learned the hit rate, p(sex ro' 6 conflict/ anorexia), and the false alarm rate,/>(sex role conflict/no anorexia), but also the low base rate, /^anorexia). Scanning through the file box should have clearly revealed the paucity of anorexic cases.
The file boxes were presented graphically as a rectangle (white frame on blue background), providing space for 20 row entries. Each row referred to an x or a not-x case (e.g., sex role conflict or no sex role conflict), or to a y or a not-y case (e.g., anorexia vs. no anorexia), respectively. However, the file was not confined to one 20-row screen; participants could scroll forward and backward between several screens (using the screen keys), comprising between 100 and 125 cases (see Table 3 ). Both file types were first described to all participants, and both types were presented graphically side by side, with their different entries referring to x or y levels. After participants had been sensitized to this difference, they were told that they had been assigned to one particular file type. This assignment constituted the manipulation of sampling direction.
Each search trial began with the presentation of (one screen of) the file box. Participants could then move the cursor to any file box entry (highlighting the active row or entry). Using the Enter key, participants could select the highlighted case. This opened a small window on the right of the file box in which the chosen row entry was first repeated (e.g., no sex role conflict) and then feedback was given about the corresponding value of the other variable (e.g., anorexia vs. no anorexia). After 2 s, the feedback window was erased, and the file box retained the same screen from which an item had been chosen on the last trial. Those cases that had been already chosen were marked hi gray ("dark white"). Participants could search as much information as they considered appropriate. To terminate the search process, they had to use the Escape key.
Immediately afterward, the criteria! question appeared on a blank screen, calling for an estimate of p(criterion/predictor). Then a horizontal graphical scale appeared at the bottom of the screen, on which judges could move a light bar to indicate their subjective confidence (on a 42-graphical unit scale). The same procedure was repeated for all tasks.
For pragmatic reasons, we could not use the same high-frequency distributions as in Experiment 1, which covered several thousand cases.
Instead, we used the stimulus distributions shown in Table 3 . For instance, the predictor box of the anorexia problem was filled with 9 cases of sex role conflict, of which 7 were anorexic and 2 were not anorexic. In addition, there were 91 cases of no sex role conflict, of which 19 were anorexic and 72 were not. These 100 cases were distributed randomly •p(y/x) = correct estimate.
across five 20-row screens of the file box. We did not use base rates so extreme that the search for positive cases (with anorexia) was too frustrating. The sequence and distribution of samples drawn by each individual participant were assessed and stored automatically.
Participants were received alone or in small groups of up to four people.
They were seated at separate computers in different locations of the experiment lab. The entire experiment lasted between 20 and 30 min, depending on the number of items drawn by individual judges. At the end of the session, participants were thoroughly debriefed.
Results
Probability judgments. We included only those 47 participants who had gathered eight observations or mote in the analyses. Mean probability judgments for all four stimulus tasks appear in Table 4 , as a function of experimental conditions. Accuracy, defined with reference to the population (i.e., the whole file), is evident in numerically low probability judgments. For a more direct measure of inaccuracy, we also computed the absolute deviation between the subjective estimates and the objectively correct value in the population ( Table 4 ). Note that analyses of the signed difference (as in Experiment 1) would yield results equivalent to those of the raw ratings because the correct value is a constant.
We conducted two-factorial (Perspective X Sampling Direction) ANOVAs for both scores. The only regularly obtained effect, across scores and tasks, was the sampling direction main effect, reflecting lower percentage judgments and higher accuracy when sampling was by the predictor rather than by the criterion. This main effect was significant for the complications problem, F(l, We should mention that, given the appropriate predictor sampling direction, the medians suggest even more accuracy (i.e., median absolute deviations of 6.0%, 10.5%, 7.9%, and 8.3%) than the means, which seem to be inflated by a few extremely inaccurate outliers. Biases in conditional probability judgments decreased to a minimum when sampling was conditional on the predictor, so that samples provided an unbiased estimate of the quantity in question.
Analyzing samples as mediators of judgment biases. Does the strong impact of sampling direction really reflect a sampling bias, or is the weak performance in the criterion search condition due to misunderstood task instructions, misleading judges to estimate pfpredictor/criterion) rather than ^(criterion/predictor)? Again, the lack of the slightest effect of the perspective manipulation speaks against the confusion of inference direction. More direct evidence for the biased sampling account and against the confusion of inference direction comes from an analysis of individually drawn stimulus samples. After all, the actual obtained proportion p*(criterion/predictor) in the sample may differ widely fromp(criterion/predictor) in the population. In particular, when sampling is by the criterion and overrepresents the rare, critical event, the sample may exaggerate the crucial base rate (cf. Figure 2 ) so that the sample estimator p*(criterion/predictor) may be much higher than the corresponding population value.
As predicted, the sample estimators that result from drawing predictor versus criterion samples from the same distribution vary strongly. The sample proportion p*(criterion/predictor) is very accurate in the predictor sampling condition but severely inflated in the criterion sampling condition. The mean sample estimators Note. P and C refer to predictor and criterion, respectively. also appear in Table 4 , next to the corresponding judgment scores, the mean sampled base rates, and the normatively correct judgment.
When sampling is conditional on the predictor, the sample statistics are unbiased and only subject to unsystematic error. Averaging over participants, the sample base rates p*(criterion) and the proportion p*(criterion/predictor) are rather close to the population parameter. In contrast, when sampling by the criterion, sample predictions deviate dramatically from the population norm because of exaggerated base rates. Participants typically drew too many instances from the crucial event (e.g., anorexia). ANOVAs conducted on the sample statistics demonstrated strong main effects for predictor versus criterion search on sample base rates, F(l,43) = 175.23,112.91,31.19, 51.39, all ps < .001, and on the p*(criterion/predictor) proportion, F(l, 43) = 46. 14, 191.45, 98.56, 436 .85, all ps < .001 (same task order as in Table 4 : complications, lung damage, anorexia, breast cancer).
It is interesting to note that the influence of sampling direction on actual sample statistics is even stronger than on subjective judgments. Thus, die distortion in the samples would justify an even larger judgment effect than is actually observed between predictor search and criterion search conditions. For example, in the anorexia task, the samples drawn by participants searching from criterion categories would normatively justify estimates over 70% (due to extreme oversampling of anorexia), as compared to judgments around 40%. Thus, although judgments of ^(anorexia/ sex role conflicts) clearly exceed the correct value in the population, they are lower than the extremely high correct value in the sample (see Table 4 ).
Discussion
The intriguing implication of these findings is that sampling biases in typical Bayesian inference tasks can fully account for the size of judgment bias effects. Indeed, the sampling bias would justify an even stronger judgment bias than is observed eventually. In many real settings, it is likely that sampling will often be guided by the vivid criterion event rather than the pallid predictor index. To the extent that judges engage in criterion search and overrepresent the criterion event, the resulting exaggeration of the originally low base rate will then produce exaggerated estimates of p(criterion/predictor), too, even when the judge herself is highly accurate and correctly understands the instruction of the judgment task.
Indeed, there are good reasons to assume that our judges did not misunderstand the task instruction but really tried to estimate p*(criterion/predictor) within the sample. As in Experiment 1, the explicit instruction to take the perspective of an expert who compares the criterion as a function of predictor levels added nothing to accuracy. The mean judgments did not reach the range of the population hit rates, which are much higher. Correlational analyses in Experiment 3 actually show that judgments were more closely related to the appropriate conditional, /j*(criterion/predictor), than to the hit rate, p*(predictor/criterion), in the sample.
Thus, there is little evidence for an alternative explanation in terms of mistaken task instructions. Likewise, we can rule out an explanation in terms of statistical format, because the information search paradigm guarantees a natural frequency format in all conditions-the learning experiment of all four types of event combinations, as well as the base rates of index card files. The huge performance variation is thus fully independent of any unnatural format.
However, our findings are consistent with a slightly paraphrased version of Gigerenzer and Hoffrage's (1995) point. The linguistic devices (i.e.. percentages or cardinal numbers) used to present extensional data may not be crucial to an efficient frequency format. Rather, the essential distinction underlying their evolutionary argument could be the distinction between inductive learning and deductive reasoning. Long-term phylogenetic and ontogenetic learning may support the assessment of frequencies within samples of observations. This asset of inductive intelligence, which seems to function very well and almost without effort (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Hintzman, 1976) , is by no means restricted to absolute frequencies. Indeed, relative frequencies or probabilities (e.g., the relative number of dangerous stimuli given particular situations) may be more informative than cardinal frequencies for adaptive behavior. In order to compare the rate of important events in different situations with unequal sample sizes, adaptive judgments must be sensitive to relative frequencies. Although this inductive function seems to be intact, the typical human deficits come into play as soon as the task calls for deductive reasoning applied to samples of different origin.
Experiment 3
Locating the deficit in the deductive component is consistent with decades of research on formal reasoning (Wason & JohnsonLaird, 1972; Woodworth & Sells, 1935) . There is little evidence that even intelligent individuals acquire mastery of formal operations (probability calculus, logical principles, transformation rules) in a general, content-independent fashion. However, rather than overstretching this point and postulating a universal deductive deficit, the present theory simply assumes a deficit for sampling constraints. One can test the viability of this assumption empirically.
In Experiment 1, judges were unable to understand sample size constraints. Having encoded 8 cases in a small sample of 10 as a large quantity and 95 cases in a large sample of 990 as a small quantity, they failed to free themselves of this relativity when the respective samples were irrelevant. Likewise, participants of Experiment 2 failed to understand the constraints of quota sampling. They did not realize that quota samples in which rare events are overrepresented cannot be used to estimate the rate of those rare events.
Experiment 3 addressed an even more fundamental aspect of the hypothesized deductive deficit. Judges may not have understood the directional constraints imposed by conditional sampling from the beginning. Thus, when given the explicit task to judge p(criterion/predictor), many judges may not have recognized that predictor sampling is more adequate than criterion sampling. When given a free choice, many judges would thus have chosen an inappropriate procedure, preferring criterion over predictor sampling. Support for this suspicion comes from the deterministic analog of Bayesian inference tasks, the well-known Wason (1966) paradigm, which shows a pervasive tendency to test one logical implication (if p then q) by its reverse (if q then p).
For a straightforward test of these ideas, participants of Experiment 3 could freely determine the sampling directions. The same materials and procedures were used as before. However, rather than being assigned to search conditions, participants could choose between two index card boxes, one of which was ordered by the predictor, whereas the other was ordered by the criterion. Choosing the criterion file would be indicative of the hypothesized metacognitive blindness for the constraints and dangers of reverse samples.
Method
Participants and design. Sixty-one male and female participants were recruited at the University of Heidelberg. They were randomly assigned to one of two perspective treatments. The second factor was quasiexperimental. Participants could choose, for each problem, the one file box that he or she felt most appropriate to the task of estimating ^criterion/ predictor), resulting in a 2 (Perspective) X 2 (Search Direction Algorithm) factorial design.
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedures were exactly the same as in Experiment 2, except for the free choice of file boxes. After both file types had been explained and presented graphically and the judgment task had been explicated, participants chose the one index card box they believed to be more appropriate. For example, they were explicitly told that the subsequent task would be to estimate the probability of anorexia given sex role conflicts in childhood, and they were shown both index card boxes (with entries referring to anorexia vs. sex role conflicts). Both the search environment and the explicit task instructions were thus available when participants made their choice.
Results and Discussion
The first question is how many participants from each perspective condition chose the appropriate sampling direction. As is evident from Table 5 , there was a modest but systematic preference for the predictor file. The numbers of participants choosing the appropriate search direction were 38,37, 35, and 46 (out of 60) for Tasks 1 to 4, respectively. The corresponding percentages are 63.3%, 61.7%, 58.3%, and 76.7%. Chi-square tests (with df = 1) show that these proportions were significantly above chance for the first and the fourth task (p < .05), and there was a tendency for the second task (p < .10). However, this relative sensitivity was independent of the verbally induced perspective (see Table 5 ). If anything, the rate of predictor sampling was somewhat higher when an incongruent perspective was induced. We included both the perspective manipulation and the (quasiexperimental factor of the) self-selected sampling direction in the data analyses. We eliminated twelve participants with impoverished samples (<8). The only regular finding obtained in various two-factorial ANOVAs, across all tasks and indexes, was due to a stable main effect of the actual sampling direction used (see Table  6 ). Estimates were quite accurate and in line with the low criterion base rates when sampling was contingent on the predictor. Inflated judgments were mainly due to those judges whose sampling was contingent on the criterion. The sampling direction main effect was significant for the complications problem, F( 1,44) = 9.49, p < .01 (mean percentage estimate), and F(l, 44) = 8.50, p < .01 (accuracy score); for the lung damage problem, F(l, 44) = 11.63, p < .01, and F(l, 44) = 11.00, p < .01; for the anorexia problem, F(l,44) = 13.56, p<. 001, and F(\, 44) = 16.14,p < .001; and somewhat reduced for the breast cancer problem, F(1, 44) = 3.47, p < .10, and F(l, 44) = 5.75, p < .05.
Neither the perspective main effect nor the Perspective X Sampling Direction interaction showed a systematic influence across tasks. The only exception arose from the breast cancer problem, in which the perspective main effect, F(l, 44) = 12.1, p < .01, was also significant. However, this is fully due to one deviating value (15.00) in the criterion sampling/predictor perspective condition (see Table 6 ) that was based on an extremely small sample size (n = 2).
Our interpretation of performance variation in terms of sampling direction is again supported by an inspection of the actual drawn sample statistics (last two columns hi Table 6 ). Only predictor sampling conserved the original p(criterion) and p(criterion/predictor), aside from sampling error, whereas criterion samples obscured the low base rate of the critical event. ANOVAs of the sample base rates and of the normative sample estimators exhibited strong main effects for sampling direction across all tasks. This holds for sample base rates p*(criterion), F(l, 44) = 226. 75, 103.82, 37.53,14 .50, as well as for sample estimators p*(criterion/ predictor), F(l, 44) = 91.19, 136.25, 261.96, 118 .04 (all ps < .001, same task order as in Table 6 ).
The biases within the samples were stronger than the corresponding main effects of sampling direction on subjective estimates. This means, again, that sampling biases, which arc logically and temporally prior to probability judgments, would justify an even stronger judgment bias than was eventually obtained. Once the sample values were taken into account, probability judgments followed the sample estimators p*(criterion/predictor) quite accurately.
Judges do not confuse p*(criterion/predictor) with the hit rates, p*(predictor/criterion), as the following analysis reveals. Pooling across all participants of Experiments 2 and 3, we regressed probability judgments on both conditional sample probabilities. Indeed, the appropriate estimator p*(criterion/predictor) contributed more to predicting judgments (ft = 0.38,0.54,0.52, and 0.56; all ps < .001) than the sample hit rate, p*(criterion/predictor) (fi = -0.07,0.22,0.03, and -0.07; only 0.22reachingp < .05). Judges correctly conditionalized criterion estimates on the predictor and did not erroneously judge p(predictor/criterion). Although judges in previous research may have sometimes confused the inference direction (Eddy, 1982; Sherman et al., 1992) , this was not the case in the present experiments. Note. P and C refer to predictor and criterion, respectively.
When judges received appropriate samples, inductive operations led to accurate judgments. In contrast, searching in the wrong direction resulted in severely biased samples that justified even stronger biases than were actually observed in the final judgments. In either case, when estimating p( criterion/predictor), judges could estimate this proportion in the sample quite accurately, regardless of their perspective and whether samples resulted from predictor or criterion search. However, while sensitive to sample statistics, some judgments entailed serious biases simply because the samples were biased.
Experiment 4
To substantiate the supposed deficit in metacognitive ability, we report one more experiment that speaks directly to both (a) a restricted insight that predictor sampling should have been preferred to criterion sampling and (b) a lack of insight that, if sampling by the criterion, samples that did not overrepresent the rare event should have led to more accurate judgments.
In Experiments 2 and 3, selecting items from one of two index card files may have been driven by pragmatic factors (e.g., getting large enough samples for all event classes, exploring an uncertain world) other than logical understanding of sampling constraints. In Experiment 4, we presented participants with descriptions of scientific studies, and we asked them to evaluate whether the conclusions drawn in those studies were correct. We described studies mat were based on predictor or criterion sampling, and if criterion sampling was used, oversampling of the rare event was strong or weak. We also manipulated instructions emphasizing the unequal costs associated with the crucial event (e.g., BC) and its complement (No BC).
Method
Participants and design. Ninety male and female students of psychology and professional university staff members took part in Experiment 4.
They were assigned to six groups of equal size. Three groups received an extra reminder, before each task, that the payoffs of the two criterion outcomes may be different; the remaining three groups did not receive this reminder. Within both instruction conditions, three different questionnaire versions were used (see below).
Materials and procedure. Each questionnaire consisted of 14 thematic
problems presented in a constant order. All items accorded to the same logical structure, as described here, with reference to the familiar mammogram item. After one paragraph of introduction into the problem content, participants read that a researcher was interested in "how reliably a mammogram indicates breast cancer." Then the base rate of the critical event was made explicit (e.g., 4% for breast cancer; cf. Appendix B). The major experimental manipulation pertained to the way in which the researcher drew a sample from the universe of all existing data.
In the predictor sampling condition, it was reported that the researcher had randomly drawn 300 M+ and 300 M-observations. This resulted For each one of nine critical items (in positions 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12) , all three sampling versions were created. Subsets of three prob-lems wen assigned to sampling conditions in a Latin square, such that each subset was associated with each sampling condition in a different questionnaire version. All problems and statistical input data are given in Appendix B.
In positions 3,6,9, and 13 of all questionnaires, four constant distracler items were included, two using predictor sampling and two using 1:1 criterion sampling. Distracters were characterized by false computations of the sample data. The intention here was, first, to increase the number of items using predictor sampling and, second, to give judges superficial reasons for rejecting the validity of some studies. In the last position, there was one item providing proportional criterion sampling, in which the researcher actually conserved the low base rate of the focal event The task here was to estimate /^Thrombosis/intake of Femovan) from a 2 X 2 distribution of 40 Femovan and Thrombosis (F and T) cases, 762 F and No T cases, 60 T and No F cases, and 4, 138 No F and No T cases. Each description of a study and its procedure ended with a conclusion by the researcher. For the nine critical items, this conclusion was consistent with ^(criterion/predictor) in the sample. Thus, in the 1:3 criterion sampling conditions of the breast cancer problem, the researcher concluded that the probability XBC/M+) was 240/(240 + 176) = 240/416 = 57.7%. In contrast, for the distracters, this computation was false. Here, the joint frequency of the crucial event combination was divided either by the sum of all four cells or by the overall frequency of the critical events, the left column sum.
Depending on the instruction condition (manipulated between judges), judges were then reminded (or not) that different errors can have differently severe consequences. We expected that this reminder might increase the tendency to oversample the critical event.
The dependent measures were administered on a new page. Judges first made a binary decision as to whether the researcher's argument was appropriate. The next measure was a 100 mm graphical confidence rating.
Judges were then asked to indicate, in free-response format, whether the study procedure was insufficient and how it could be improved. They also provided their own opinion regarding the estimated conditional probability.
Results and Discussion
We scored binary correctness decisions +J (correct) or -I (false) and multiplied by the confidence ratings (scaled from 0 to 1). We averaged the resulting evaluation index, which had a maximal range from +1 to -/ (a positive sign indicating acceptance of the statistical procedure), within judges over all items of the same condition (i.e., predictor sampling, 1:3 criterion sampling, 1:1 criterion sampling, distractors, and last item). Table 7 provides the mean evaluation scores as a function of these five task conditions, pooling over the completely ineffective instruction manipulation. Judges tended to recognize that predictor sampling was most appropriate, but the evaluation of the 1:1 criterion sampling procedure was not much different from predictor sampling. The largest difference was due to the rejection of 1:3 criterion sampling, which was clearly considered most inferior.
We conducted two ANOVAs regarding the relative preference of predictor over criterion sampling and the ability to understand the danger of oversampling the infrequent event. In the first ANOVA, we included the instruction manipulation as a betweenjudges factor and the contrast of predictor sampling and 1:1 criterion sampling (the typical oversampling shown in Experiments 2 and 3) as a within-judges factor. The only significant effect was due to a sampling main effect, reflecting a slight but significant preference for predictor sampling, F(l, 88) = 9.61, p < .01. However, what is more impressive than this relative preference for predictor sampling (by 38% of all judges) is that 62% of all participants were either undecided (41%) or even believed that 1:1 criterion sampling was better (21%).
In the other ANOVA, we contrasted 1:1 and 1:3 criterion sampling, along with the instruction factor. Again, there was only one significant main effect, reflecting a strong bias to accept 1:1 oversampling more than 1:3 criterion sampling, F(l, 88) = 43.35, p < .001. This finding not only corroborates the conclusion that judges failed to understand the consequences of oversampling but also suggests that they were apparently misguided by superficial cues. They seem to have believed that it was better to have equal sample sizes or that too small a sample of the critical event was of disadvantage. They almost totally ignored the oversampling problem, providing nice evidence for the neglect of sampling constraints.
We conducted regression analyses to examine predictors of the sampling evaluations. The first predictor was judges' educational status-psychology student (-1) versus people working in natural science domains (+1). The second predictor was a three-level rating of the sophistication of each judge's free-format comments on the sampling procedure. The third predictor was a score measuring the acceptance of the last item of the questionnaire, in which the population base rate was exactly conserved in the sample. Educational status contributed significantly to the tendency to prefer predictor sampling over 1:1 criterion sampling, /3 = 0.31, t(&6) = 3.08, p < .01, and to the reduction of the erroneous tendency to prefer 1:1 over 1:3 criterion sampling, J3 = 0.22, «(86) = 2.14,p < .05. Yet whatever the reason for this educationrelated improvement, it was independent of the degree of sophistication and independent of the acceptance of an unbiased sampling procedure. Neither sophistication (|3 = -0.11 and 0.07) nor evaluation of the last item ((3 = -0.06 and -0.05) contributed to predicting appropriate responses to the nine central items.
Virtually nobody articulated the exact nature of the sampling problem in response to the free-format question.
General Discussion
Like previous researchers, we demonstrated that biases in conditional probability judgments are greatly reduced, or even disappear, under particular conditions. However, whereas other research has pointed to facilitative conditions like frequency formats (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) , natural category meanings (Gavanski & Hui, 1992) , causal models (Ajzen, 1977) , or conversational pragmatics (Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & Naderer, 1991; Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995) , the present findings highlight a strong influence of sampling constraints on probability judgments.
We based the present approach on an analytic distinction between inductive and deductive mental operations. The inductive component consists in the formation of a probability estimate on the basis of available samples. This is essentially a data-driven, inductive operation, although it is potentially susceptible to deductive influences (viz., expectancies). The second component of the judgment process involves mental operations and transformations applied on sample estimates, using appropriate deductive devices.
The crucial theoretical assumption, and the central empirical message of the reported studies, is that the inductive operation of quantifying the occurrence rate of a focal event in a sample is largely unimpaired and rather accurate. Judgment biases do not arise during this quantification process within available samples, but only because judges lack the necessary metacognitive skills to detect and correct for the biases that are already inherent in the available samples.
We demonstrated this deficit in understanding sampling constraints in several ways. In Experiment 1, judges did not understand the unequal, misleading scale units by which statistics were presented. For example, the task was to judge p(anorexia/sex role conflicts). In fact, given a sex role conflict, there were 78 cases with and 197 cases without anorexia; so the correct solution was 78/78 + 197. However, when these input statistics were scaled with reference to misleading subsets-78 out of 101 cases and 197 out of 925 cases-judges interpreted 78/101 as a large quantity and 197/925 as a small quantity, thus exaggerating the former quantity. In doing so, judges misunderstood the logical constraints, because in order to judge anorexia within the subset of people having sex role conflicts, only the nominators (78 and 197) were relevant, whereas the denominators (101 and 925) contained mostly people without sex role conflicts and were therefore irrelevant.
In Experiment 2, we acquired samples through active information search, which always warrants a natural scaling unit and frequency format. Sampling was conditional either on the predictor or on the criterion. When we sampled by the predictor, the resulting samples were unbiased and the inductive ability led to accurate judgments. However, when we sampled by the criterion, the low base rate event was highly overrepresented in the samples. Ignoring the severe constraints of selectively drawn samples, judges overestimated the low base rate event dramatically, though judgments reflected the sample statistics quite accurately (aside from regression). Judges did not simply confuse p(criterion/predictor) with p(predictor/criterion).
In Experiment 3, the deductive deficit was even more apparent in the fundamental inability to choose an appropriate sampling procedure in the first place. Even though there was no doubt about the task instruction to judge ^(anorexia/sex role conflict), almost 40% of the judges preferred sampling by the criterion (anorexia) over predictor sampling.
Experiment 4 demonstrated that the failures to understand the advantage of predictor sampling and the consequences of oversampling of the focal criterion event was also evident in evaluations of the appropriateness of sampling procedures used in research.
Our active information search paradigm allowed us to elucidate the samples assumed to mediate the judgment performance. Biases in the sampled information not only accounted for the full size of judgment biases, but actually justified even stronger biases than were manifested in the judgments. An important role played by cognitive sampling processes in the formation of judgment biases is not confined to artificial experiments in which participants can search for data in an index card file. Almost every real judgment problem involves some kind of sampling. Even when no explicit information search takes place, judgments involve implicit sampling from memory-with the same consequence. Memory search and inference direction will often focus on the criterion events (breast cancer, anorexia, etc.), which are then overrepresented in mentally generated samples, obscuring the originally low base rates. In any case, the domain of the present theoretical approach may be broader than expected at first sight. However, preformed judgments of p(y/x) stored in memory (cf. Hastie & Park, 1986) and judgments using formal calculus to compute p(y/\) mathematically are not covered by the domain.
Is our basic assumption about inductive assets and deductive deficits consistent with other psychological evidence? We believe there is strong support for both aspects. On the one hand, there is convergent evidence from the areas of memory for frequency (Hintzman, 1976; Jonides & Jones, 1992; Sedlmeier et al., 1998) , contingency detection (Allan, 1993; Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) , and causal inference (Wassermann, Elek, Chadosh, & Baker, 1993 ) that the cognitive ability to assess sample probabilities is normally operating well. Common to all these paradigms is a cognitive operation that we have called inductive, defined as a data-driven process of quantifying the relative prevalence of a prompted event in a cognitively represented sample. On the other hand, a long tradition of research highlights deficits in deductive reasoning. Pertinent evidence comes from syllogistic reasoning (Oakhill & Gamham, 1993) and the Wason paradigm (Pollard & Evans, 1987) . Decades of research in these paradigms have led cognitive psychologists to doubt that even intelligent people ever apply deductive operations on a purely formal, content-free basis.
To be sure, research has shown deductive thinking to improve when the problem content is socially meaningful and important (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Friedrich, 1993) , when deductions are relevant 01 salient from the individual's perspective (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Sperber et al., 1995) , or when inductive heuristics (e.g., associative processes hi analogical reasoning; Holyoak, 1985) or concrete operations (e.g., spatial metaphors for transitivity problems; Potts, 1974) can be used to solve deductive problems. However, these qualifications notwithstanding, the present approach is only concerned with deductive reasoning in the context of sampling constraints. The available evidence on this specific topic suggests that sampling constraints are very hard to understand. People draw naive conclusions from obviously selective samples (Koriat et al., 1980; Patrick & lacono, 1991) , they do not understand the statistical notion of regression (Furby, 1973; Rulon, 1941) , and they have a very restricted notion of the gains in reliability that result from extended aggregation (Fiedler, Walther, Freytag et al., 2000) . Developmental studies also show that ontogenetic barriers to statistical judgments originate in reasoning difficulties rather than In the inductive estimation component (AM, Moore, & Dixon, 1992; Dixon & Moore, 1996; Inhelder & Piaget, 1969) .
Directional constraints constitute a particularly severe obstacle for deductive reasoning (cf. Barouillet & Lecas, 1998) . Numerous experimental and anecdotal findings testify to the difficulty in understanding the nonequivalence of p(criterion/predictor) and p(predictor/criterion), whether in deterministic (Wason, 1966) or probabilistic tasks (Sherman et al., 1992) . At the linguistic level, it is hard for young children to comprehend why German Shepherds are dogs but dogs need not be German Shepherds. Even intelligent, adult language users continue to be puzzled by directional propositions lite, "The average Korean person is smaller than the average American," but "Small people are more likely American than Korean."
The difficulty in understanding directional propositions is most salient when it is exhibited by highly educated people, like scientists. One prominent example is the significance-testing debate (Carver, 1978; Hagen, 1997; Rozeboom, 1960) , in which researchers are criticized for confusing p(dataftheory) with p(theory/data). Another intriguing demonstration comes from a recent article by Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu (1994) . Addressing the seeming contradiction between overconfidence (Keren, 1991; Yates, 1990) and conservatism (Edwards, 1968; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983) , these authors showed that within the same data set, one can obtain both phenomena, depending on the direction of analysis. If one fixes the objective probabilities of events and considers the corresponding subjective judgments, the typical finding is conservatism, or undeiconfidence; subjective values are not extreme enough, or regressive. In contrast, if subjective judgments are fixed as a given and if objective probabilities are considered as a dependent variable, then one gets overconfidence; the objective values are less extreme than the subjective figures. The failure to detect, over many decades, that these two seemingly contradictory effects coexist reflects researchers' failure to recognize that regression of y on x does not prevent x from regressing on y.
The basic difficulty with directional reasoning is not only evident in probabilistic judgment tasks; judges actually studied it most intensively in deterministic reasoning problems. Translating the breast cancer problem to Wason's (1966) conditional reasoning paradigm would involve presenting four cards, the visible sides of which show the entries M+, M-, BC, and No BC. Participants would be told that each card had a mammography result on one side and a breast cancer diagnosis on the other side. Their task instruction would be to turn around those cards that were logically crucial to test the validity of the rule, "If M+ is on one side of a card, then BC must be present on the other side."
From countless previous studies, we know that many (if not most) participants would select the M+ and the BC card, which clearly reflects a lack of deductive mastery. While the M+ choice (i.e., predictor sampling) is correct, the selection of BC (criterion sampling) is irrelevant because the rule ("If M+, then BC') allows for both M+ and M-on the back side of the BC card (i.e., the rule "IfM+, then BC' does not exclude that BC can also appear given M-). Hardly anybody would select the No BC card, which would, however, be a correct choice, for if No BC is on one side, there must be no M + on the other side (otherwise, the rule "If M+, then BC" is violated). This neglect of No BC selections leads to the oversampling of the low base rate event, BC.
What is the reason for the robust and persistent failure on the (formal, content-free version of the) Wason selection task? On the one hand, research in this paradigm has shown that people do not appear to engage in spontaneous, playful practicing of deductive devices, such as logical truth tables. Once participants are explained the solution of a Wason card problem, they have no difficulty in understanding the logical rule; they simply do not use it spontaneously. On the other hand, performance on the selection task improves when the complementary, nonfocal event. No BC, is made salient (e.g., Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Sperber et al., 1995) . Thus, when the possibility of rule violation arises (e.g., emphasizing that mammography may produce false alarms, thereby raising the relevance of No BC cases), a higher proportion of participants would correctly select the No BC card.
By analogy, this analysis suggests that performance on conditional probability judgment tasks could be improved as well if judges were trained to organize the full problem space. While this question is clearly a challenge for future research, we doubt that the analogy will carry us very far. The ineffectiveness of the perspective manipulations in the present experiments (which made the relevance to compare BC and No BC or M+ and M-perfectly clear) already suggests that relevance manipulations alone will be hardly sufficient. In Experiment 4, the warning that different costs were associated with BC or No BC selections did not affect the results. Rather, Experiment 4 points out a more simple and mundane reason for oversampling the rare event BC-namely, the concern for sufficient sample size. If too few BC cases were drawn, the probability p(BC/M+) could not be estimated.
The probabilistic task and the deterministic task differ hi one crucial aspect. Whereas the deterministic rule "If M+, then BC" makes No BC a crucial test and BC irrelevant, as we have seen, both BC and No BC are relevant in the probabilistic case. This is because p(NoBC/M+)can be simply rewritten as 1 -p(BC/M+), showing that BC and No BC afford equivalent (albeit complementary) measures of the same rule. Neither BC nor No BC will always come along with M+. Oaksford and Chater (1994) presented an elegant and convincing proof for the relevance of selecting the criterion event, BC, in a probabilistic world.
The divergence between logical and statistical rules may also suggest an essential reason why the ability to apply, and the habit to play around with, logical-deductive devices has not evolved. These devices can only be applied under ideal conditions that are rarely met in the real world. Logical rules are trivially falsified in reality when actual rules are merely statistical. Likewise, logical calculus is often built on the idealizing assumption of binary, fully complementary events. However, the real world is not strictly binary. Ordinary language often provides rather ill-defined, fuzzy labels for event classes, making prepositional derivations very insecure. In such a learning environment, it may not be too surprising to find that individuals have learned to rely on their inductive devices-their sample based estimates-more than on deductive tools with dubious assumptions that are hardly ever met. In the probability, common reference scale condition, 69% of the patients attended Hospital A and did not have complications; 27% of the patients attended Hospital B and did not have complications; 3% of the patients attended Hospital A and had complications; and 1% of the patients attended Hospital B and had complications.
Task: What is the probability of a dangerous complication if one attends Hospital B?
Answer: The probability is %.
Task 2: Lung Damage
In a study concerning the pharmacological agent Dermofit, a product used against stretch marks, 8.500 women who gave birth in the last two years were examined. The study was to test whether Dermofit causes prenatal lung damage.
Criterion perspective:
Imagine you are a lawyer who represents affected mothers against the manufacturer. Therefore, you want to know whether mothers of affected children used Dermofit more often than mothers of healthy children.
Predictor perspective:
Imagine you are a member of the public health system who must check whether Dermofit is responsible for the prenatal lung damage.
Therefore, you are interested in whether mothers who used Dermofit have children with lung damage more often than mothers who did not use Dermofit.
The statistical information in all four conditions:
The study contained data from 8,500 children and their mothers.
In the frequency, incompatible reference scale condition, 169 children had lung damage and 8,331 did not; of the lung-damaged children, in 131 cases the mother had used Dermofit and in 38 cases she had not; and of the healthy children, in 5,573 cases the mother had used Dermofit and in 2,758 cases she had not.
In the probability, incompatible reference scale condition, 2% of the children had lung damage and 98% did not; of the lungdamaged children, in 77.5% cases the mother had used Dermofit and in 22.5% cases she had not; and of the healthy children, in 66.9%
cases the mother had used Dermofit and in 33.1% cases she had not.
In the frequency, common reference scale condition, 5,573 children were healthy and the mother had used Dermofit; 2,758 children were healthy and the mother had not used Dermofit; 131 children were til and the mother had used Dermofit; and 38 children were ill and the mother had not used Dermofit.
In the probability, common reference scale condition, 65.6% children were healthy and the mother had used Dermofit;
32.4% children were healthy and the mother had not used Dermofit;
1.5% children were ill and the mother had used Dermofit; and 0.5% children were ill and the mother had not used Dermofit.
Task: What is the probability of a prenatal lung damage, if the mother used Dermofit?
Answer. The probability is %.
Task 3: Anorexia
Anorexia is difficult to treat. Therefore, scientists try to discover its causes. Experts believe that one important cause of anorexia is an unresolved sex role conflict.
Imagine that you are a therapist and that you work mainly with anorexic women. You are investigating whether anorexia is connected with unresolved sex role conflicts. You are interested in whether there is a difference in frequency of unresolved sex role conflicts between anorexic and non-anorexic women.
Imagine that you are a teacher interested in possible consequences of unresolved sex role conflicts. Recently, you have noticed an increasing number of children with very difficult sex role identification. You are interested in whether girls with sex role conflicts are more likely to become anorexic later in life than girls without sex role conflicts.
For the study, 1,026 women were examined.
In the frequency, incompatible reference scale condition, 101 women were anorexic and 925 were not; of the anorexic women, 78 had unresolved sex role conflict and 23 did not; and of the non-anorexic women, 197 had an unresolved sex role conflict and 728 did not.
In the probability, incompatible reference scale condition, 10% of the women were anorexic and 90% were not; of the anorexic women, 77% had an unresolved sex role conflict and 23% did not; and of the non-anorexic women, 21% had an unresolved sex role conflict and 79% did not.
In the frequency, common reference scale condition, 728 women were not anorexic and did not have unresolved sex role conflicts; 197 women were not anorexic and had sex role conflicts; 78 women were anorexic and had sex role conflicts; and 23 women were anorexic and did not have sex role conflicts.
In the probability, common reference scale condition, 71 % of the women were not anorexic and did not have unresolved sex rote conflicts; 19% of the women were not anorexic and had sex role conflicts; 8% of the women were anorexic and had sex role conflicts;
and 2% of the women were anorexic and did not have sex role conflicts.
Task: What is the probability of anorexia if a woman has an unresolved sex role conflict?
Task 4: Breast Cancer
Mammography is one of the most important methods of diagnosing of breast cancer early. This method enables us to detect very small lumps in breasts.
Imagine that you are a gynecologist. As a young researcher, you want to know how useful mammography is in detecting breast cancer.
Therefore, you are interested in the differences in results between women with and women without breast cancer.
Imagine that you are a gynecologist As a young researcher, you are interested in the quality of diagnosis by mammography, namely in the information provided by a positive and a negative result.
The study contains data from 1,000 women.
In the frequency, incompatible reference scale condition, In the probability, common reference scale condition, 89.5% of women did not have breast cancer and had a negative mammogram; 9.5% of women did not have breast cancer and had a positive mammogram; 0.8% of women had breast cancer and a positive mammogram; and 0.2% of women had breast cancer and a negative mammogram.
Task: What is the probability of breast cancer, if a women has a positive mammogram result?
(Appendix S follows)
